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We ask whether FX dealers from Kyrgyzstan, a low income country, have similar 
perceptions to FX dealers from other international financial centers. Perceptions of 
Kyrgyz FX dealers in the interbank market are tested using detailed survey data against 
survey information from five major financial centers. The survey evidence finds that the 
FX dealers’ responses from the Kyrgyz interbank market differ from those from other 
international financial centers. Stark differences arise in the perceptions concerning the 
effectiveness of central bank interventions and the influence of speculation. 
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Do currency traders from a low income country with a low level of financial 
development have similar perceptions about the influence of fundamentals on exchange rate 
movements to their colleagues from developed financial markets? The question’s relevance 
stems from the common belief that currency traders in underdeveloped financial markets 
exhibit myopic behavior. One view is that uncertainty stemming from poor macroeconomic 
policy and a lack of central bank credibility is responsible for such behavior. Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) provide indirect evidence using macroeconomic variables. They show that 
many emerging market countries resort to pegging strategies, despite counter claims by the 
countries’ monetary authorities that the domestic currency floats freely. Currency traders in 
such an environment feel that (unpredictable) long-run fundamentals do not help them predict 
exchange rate trends. Another view emphasizes that short-sightedness stems from market 
structure. The microstructure view of exchange rates, advanced by Lyons (1995, 2001) and 
Evans and Lyons (2002), claims that currency traders are intermediaries that primarily 
redistribute incoming customer orders. According to this view, variables such as order flow or 
bid-ask spreads have a larger impact on exchange rates than do macroeconomic variables.
 If 
true, then large market spreads and exchange rate volatility in underdeveloped markets is 
explained by market structure (i.e., low liquidity, lack of derivate products).  
The objective of this paper is to report findings from a foreign exchange (FX) survey 
that sheds light on whether currency traders from a low income country have similar 
perceptions on the influence of fundamentals, speculation, and foreign exchange interventions 
for exchange rate movements to their colleagues from developed financial centers. FX 
surveys document the extent to which FX traders are heterogeneous in their beliefs and 
behavior and seek to uncover various links between the microstructure of the currency market   2
and macroeconomic variables.
1 Perceptions of Kyrgyz FX dealers in the interbank market are 
tested using detailed survey data against survey information from five major financial centers: 
New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The comparative study also attempts 
to fill the empirical void on perceptions of currency traders in developing economies. We treat 
the FX traders’ views from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan as representative for an underdeveloped 
financial market and low income economy (Kyrgyz GDP per capita was $376.8 in 2003 and 
$435.0 in 2004). By underdeveloped FX market, we mean that there are no forward markets, a 
high level of dollarization, customer driven FX transactions (i.e., low level of speculative 
activity), and a low level of financial participation in the interbank market. These properties 
of the Kyrgyz FX market are representative for FX markets in neighbouring CIS countries 
and many other developing economies.  
The methodological framework in this study relies heavily on the questionnaires used 
in Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung et al. (2000), and Cheung and Chinn (2000). The 
standardized questions used in these studies are adapted to the Kyrgyz market and allow us to 
compare the evidence on trading behavior between developed and less developed FX markets. 
The survey responses find that the perceptions of FX traders from Bishkek are not consistent 
with the trader's perceptions from New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
We argue that stark differences in microstructure forces (i.e., market liquidity, asymmetric 
information, and market dominance) account for the heterogeneous views across less 
developed and developed FX markets. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the survey’s design. The 
second section provides background information on Kyrgyz FX traders. The third section 
                                                 
1 FX surveys are an established tool used to identify the price setting process of foreign exchange traders, see 
Allen and Taylor (1990), Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung et al. (2000), and Cheung and Chinn (2000), Gehrig 
and Menkhoff (2004, 2005) and Menkhoff (1998, 2001), and Taylor and Allen (1992). Their acceptance in the 
economics profession arose because of the empirical inadequacies of exchange rate models and the need to 
bridge the gap between concepts forwarded by academic economists and the day-by-day concerns of currency 
traders.   3
confronts the empirical results for the Kyrgyz interbank market with stylized facts from 
previous studies for developed FX markets. Section four offers conclusions. 
 
 
1. Survey Design  
The survey's design uses the standardized questionnaires from Cheung and Wong 
(2000), Cheung et al. (2000), and Cheung and Chinn (2000) as a starting point. This was done 
intentionally to facilitate the comparison of FX dealer perceptions between international 
financial centers. Because of specific institutional features of the Kyrgyz FX market, not all 
questions used in the studies by Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung et al. (2000), and Cheung 
and Chinn (2000) apply. The adapted questions to the Kyrgyz market that highlight 
institutional aspects of the Kyrgyz market are discussed separately in the next section. These 
questions relate to microstructure issues focusing on the determination of bid-ask spreads, 
market dominance for select cross rates, and the speed of information dissemination. 
The data for this study are obtained from mail-delivered questionnaires prepared by 
staff from the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) between June 2005 and 
September 2005.
2 The survey was conducted in an environment where the macro-economic 
conditions in the Kyrgyz Republic may be described as stable.
3 The period since 2001 has 
been characterized by successful macroeconomic stabilization, with further progress on 
structural reform, albeit at a pace slower than hoped.
4 Underlying growth has been stable at 
around 5 percent per annum and overall economic activity has diversified, with less reliance 
on agriculture and export sales to traditional trading partners. Inflation was reduced and 
                                                 
2 The survey studies by Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung et al. (2000), and Cheung and Chinn (2000) were conducted in the 
second half of the 1990s. Since then, survey evidence from the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivates Market Activity 2005 show that FX markets have continued to expand. This means comparative differences 
between Kyrgyzstan and other financial markets are understated. 
3 The Kyrgyz Republic is a small, open transition economy. The main exports are gold and agriculture. In recent years 
progress has been made in alleviating poverty.  Kyrgyzstan is among the more advanced transition economies in Central Asia 
in terms of market reforms. International Monetary Fund (2003) offers an overview of the Kyrgyz financial system. 
4 The Kyrgyz Republic has experienced three distinct periods of macroeconomic development since independence. The 
period until 1996 was characterized by macroeconomic instability, a common development in the CIS after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The period from 1996 to 2000 saw a resumption of growth and a decline in inflation. However, the large 
external shock owing to the Russian financial crisis in 1998 undermined these positive developments.    4
sustained in the low single digits, well below than in partner countries, and thus the real 
effective exchange rate has not appreciated as the nominal effective exchange rate has 
strengthened. 
Currency traders in the Kyrgyz interbank market are the NBKR and 34 active FX 
dealers from 19 commercial banks. Trading in the interbank market is from 8:00 am to 5:00 
pm and is preformed through a platform developed by the NBKR.
5 The front-end of the 
trading platform (i.e., information observed by all traders) specifies the FX quote, the volume, 
and the commercial bank. Most often only one-sided quotes are entered in the system in order 
to signal the trader's willingness to buy or sell. The back-end of the trading platform (i.e., 
information not observed by all traders) gives information on the completed FX transaction 
only to the participants involved and to the NBKR. The NBRK hence has an information 
advantage over other market participants, because only the central bank possesses real-time 
information on order flow trading for the FX interbank market.
6   
The NBKR survey was sent to all FX dealers active in the Kyrgyz interbank market. 
All traders complied and returned their responses to the NBKR within three weeks. The 100% 
response rate means that our survey covers all active FX traders in Kyrgyzstan. Previous FX 
dealer surveys by Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001), and Cheung et al. 
(2000) had response rates often below 15%.
7 Despite a high participation rate two issues need 
to be mentioned when we compare our results with those in Cheung and Wong (2000), 
Cheung and Chinn (2001), and Cheung et al. (2000). First, the low number of Kyrgyz traders 
in the FX market reflects the limits of financial surveys for less developed financial markets. 
The limited number of observations could give rise to heterogeneity problems if Kyrgyz 
                                                 
5 Translated from Russian, the trading platform is called "Trade Informational System for Operations in the 
Foreign Exchange Market." 
6 Developed FX interbank markets that trade through trading platforms such as EBS and Reuters Dealings do not 
provide aggregate order flow information in real time to FX participants. 
7 The response rates were 32.15% from Hong Kong (227 survey respondents), 14.42% from Tokio (76), and 
13.82% from Singapore (89) in Cheung and Wong (2000); 8.1% from the United States (142) in Cheung and 
Chinn (2000), and 5.8% (110) from the United Kingdom in Cheung et al. (2000). Response rates in Taylor and 
Allen (1992) and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2005) are higher.   5
dealers demonstrate a high level of diverse beliefs. Second, the responses of the NBKR 
survey may not be as objective as the responses given in surveys conducted by economists 
from academia. If Kyrgyz FX dealers feel they are not completely independent from the 
NBKR, there may be a tendency to give the "right" answer as opposed to the "true" answer. 
This issue maybe especially problematic for interpreting uniform responses that address 
questions related to central bank interventions.    
 
2. Background Information on FX Trading in Kyrgyzstan  
 
Underdeveloped FX markets provide illuminating answers for many microstructure 
issues on market liquidity, spread setting, asymmetric information, and market dominance. 
This section presents descriptive information on these issues specific to the Kyrgyz FX 
market. The discussion is useful for the comparative analysis between international financial 
centers in the next section.  
 
Information on traders and bank structure  
  Table 1 summarizes information on survey respondents and their organization. The 
first two questions (1a and 1b) ask about the job title and the trader’s experience. The 
distribution of job titles and years of trading experience is not identical. Almost two-thirds of 
the dealers are treasurers or managers. In terms of experience, a third of the FX dealers stated 
they have less than three years of experience.
 The other experience categories of 3 to 5 years, 
5 to 7 years, and more than 7 years are almost equally represented. The responses find that 
experience however is not equated with management responsibility. A rank sum test rejects 
the null hypothesis that FX dealers with seven or more years of experience are   6
treasurers/managers. This suggests that the seniority of the survey respondents does not 
correspond with management responsibility.
8 
  The intraday position limit is the maximum open position a dealer is authorized to 
assume during the day. Since in most cases, dealers square their positions at the end of the 
trading day, the intraday position limit can be used as a proxy for a dealer’s trading capacity. 
Question 1c shows the responses to the position limits. The position limits for almost half of 
the FX dealers lies between 50’000 and 100’000 USD, a scale that is 1’000 times smaller for 
most experienced traders operating in developed FX centers.
9  
  Questions 1d to 1g provide information on bank characteristics: staff size, presence of 
foreign capital, average FX turnover, and transactions type. FX dealers tend to work in small 
groups of two or three. Almost half of the FX dealers’ banks operate with foreign capital. 
Kazakhstan, for example, has a financial stake in four of the nineteen Kyrgyz banks. Next, the 
responses for question 1f show that the average daily FX turnover for most Kyrgyz banks is 
between 1 and 3 million som (roughly 25'000 and 75'000 USD).   
A further feature of FX trading in the Kyrgyz Republic is that it is customer driven. 
Question 1g shows that 94% of interbank dealers say they conduct primarily trades for 
customers. It is rare that the dealers engage independently in speculative trades. This feature 
of the Kyrgyz spot market implies that there is a shortage of stabilizing speculators, which has 
implications for interpreting the size of spreads and the role of fundamentals discussed in the 
next section. 
 
 Bid-ask  spreads 
  Table 2 provides responses to four questions concerning bid-ask spreads offered by 
banks to their established clients for purposes of executing customer trades. The bank's clients 
                                                 
8 Previous FX surveys did not examine the correlation between experience and management responsibility.  
9 Cheung and Wong (2000) find that a quarter of the FX dealers in their survey for Asian financial markets had 
limits of $55 million or higher. One way to compare internationally the position limits is to scale them by the 
bank's balance sheets. Such a measure shows that the Kyrgyz limits are considerably smaller than those of their 
foreign colleagues.   7
use its foreign exchange services to carry out their commercial activities (import and export of 
goods and services). The information on bid-ask spreads offered to customer clients acts as a 
proxy for interbank spreads, because of the interbank market's practice of offering only one-
sided quotes. The evidence in Table 2 is thus not comparable to other FX survey studies. 
  The first question 2a asks: what is the typical bid-ask spread quoted to clients in 
customer trades? The respondents were asked to give spreads for the US dollar, the Russian 
ruble, euro, and the Kazak tenge. The descriptive statistics, given under the heading of 2a, 
show that there are large differences in spreads (as measured by their average, median, and 
standard deviation) across the four currencies; a result observed even in developed FX 
markets.
10 A surprising result is the observation that in a dollarized economy (73% as 
measured by deposits in 2005) the spreads are larger for the hard currencies, U.S. dollar and 
euro, than for the commercial activity related currencies, the Kazak tenge and the Russian 
ruble. 
  Next, the FX dealers were asked if the bid-ask spread is determined by convention or 
by the potential cost of making the trade. The responses to question 2b show that 81% felt 
habit formation determines the bid-ask spread. To gain further insights on what explains 
market conformity, question 2c lists five explanations: bank policy, maintain client 
relationship, image for the bank, profit maximization, and the practice of following other 
major players. The most frequently cited answer was to secure a good image for the bank. 
This reflects a possible sign of market infancy, because profit maximization is not frequently 
mentioned. The last question seeks to unfold the motives for quoting bid-ask spreads for 
customer trades that differ from market convention.  Question 2d lists the responses for seven 
different market situations (i.e., thin and quiet market, thin and nervous market, an 
unexpected change in market trading, market news, increased market volatility, holding a 
                                                 
10 Spot bid-ask spreads of the cross rates for Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, British pound, and Australian dollar are larger than 
the (bid-ask) spreads involving the US dollar or euro. Ma et al. (2004) show large differences in spreads for non-deliverable 
forwards in Asian currencies.    8
position against market trend, and a quote for a specific customer). The responses attempt to 
separate the role of liquidity, volatility, market trends from individual customer treatment. 
Increased market volatility and an unexpected change in market trading are the most frequent 
answers.  
 
 Market  dominance 
The influence of market dominance in currency markets can be easily tested with 
survey questions and acts as a consistency check on the previous results. Cheung et al. (2000) 
find evidence that big players in London dominate the market for the U.S. dollar/Swiss franc 
and the U.S. dollar/ U.K. pound. Similarly, Cheung and Chinn (2001) document evidence of 
market dominance in the New York market. 
Table 3a shows the responses to the question whether Kyrgyz traders agree if FX 
markets are dominated by one or a few big players. Four currency markets are considered: the 
Kyrgyz som / US dollar, the Kyrgyz som / Russian ruble, the Kyrgyz som / euro, and the 
Kyrgyz som / Kazak tenge. FX dealers feel strongly (91.2%) that the Kyrgyz som / US dollar 
market is dominated by one or few big banks, whereas the market concentration is perceived 
to be lower for the other currencies. A high level of market dominance and dollarization may 
explain the large spreads for the U.S. dollar in Table 2, yet these properties are unable to 
account for the even larger spreads for the euro.
  Low commercial demand for the euro was a 
frequent response in follow-up interviews.     
   Table 3b provides responses to the sources of competitive advantage for the large 
players in the FX market. The survey respondents were asked to tick three answers to the 
eight explanations: operating costs, information, size of customer base, ability to handle large 
trades, influencing the exchange rate, ability to offer new FX products, and experience. The 
overwhelming response is customer base.     
   9
 Market  information 
  The speed with which new information is absorbed in a market reflects the degree of 
market liquidity. Generally in liquid FX markets, news is assimilated in asset prices in a 
matter of minutes, whereas in non liquid FX markets the process takes longer. Question 4 asks 
currency traders how fast they believe the market can digest new information when 
considering economic news, political news, customer information, cash market information, 
and news from the NBKR. The responses suggest that it takes more than 10 minutes for new 
information to be fully incorporated, a result at odds with many event studies for developed 
FX markets. Anderson et al. (2003) and others show that in developed financial markets 
prices respond considerably faster to new information.  
  Table 4 shows that news from the NBRK is assimilated the quickest. Close to 40% of 
the respondents said it took less than 10 minutes. In many instances, there is strong evidence 
that other forms of news may take considerable time (i.e., more than 30 minutes) to 
assimilate. Economic news appears to feed through to exchange rates just as quickly as 
customer information. This last result is odd because the general view is that public 
information should be assimilated more quickly than (private) customer-based information.       
 
3. Survey Responses: Bishkek versus the Major Financial Centers 
  To answer the question whether the perceptions of FX dealers from underdeveloped 
markets differ from dealers from developed markets, we compare the NBKR survey responses 
from the interbank market in Bishkek with those from the interbank market in New York, 
London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore. To do this we rely on survey responses in 
Cheung et al. (2000), Cheung and Wong (2000), and Cheung and Chinn (2001). Direct 
comparison is possible because of the standardized questions. Our criterion for comparison 
relies on common questions concerning economic fundamentals influencing the exchange 
rate, i.e., the role of PPP, exchange rate predictability, and central bank interventions.    10
  Our comparative analysis uses independence tests to examine whether Bishkek dealers 
behave the same as FX dealers in the other financial centers.  Rejection of the null implies 
evidence of incongruous perceptions between traders from the different financial centers. The 
tests are conducted for Bishkek dealers against two groups of homogenous financial centers. 
The North Atlantic group defined by FX dealers from New York (19% of global FX 
transactions as measured by the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivates Market Activity, see BIS 2005) and London (33%) represents the largest financial 
centers for FX trading, whereas the Asian group defined by FX dealers from Hong Kong 
(5%), Tokyo (9%), and Singapore (6%) represents the second tier.
11 In Tables 5 and 6, we 
show that our choice of homogenous groups for the Asian and North Atlantic block is 
statistically supported. The p-values of the independence tests for the two groups without the 
Bishkek dealers are given in parenthesis. They reveal that the null hypothesis of common 
perceptions for the North Atlantic group is never rejected at the 5% level and that the Asian 
group demonstrates evidence of common beliefs except for five questions concerning 
speculation (5c) and central bank intervention (6b). This information serves as a reference 
when discussing the evidence for Bishkek.   
 
  Economic fundamentals as a predictor of exchange rate movements 
  Table 5 presents responses from FX traders to four questions on economic 
fundamentals and the exchange rate. The first question asks whether exchange rate 
movements accurately reflect changes in fundamentals for three time horizons: intradaily, 
medium run (less than six months), and long run (more than six months). The affirmative 
responses given in Table 5a show that there is not much disparity in perceptions between 
                                                 
11 Further tests reveal that the North Atlantic and the Asian group do not have uniform perceptions. In this paper 
we do not investigate why this is the case. We also considered without success to group the financial centers 
along exchange rate regimes according to the IMF classification: independently floating (New York, London, 
Tokyo), managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate (Singapore, Bishkek), and currency 
board arrangement (Hong Kong).    11
Bishkek traders and those from other financial centers. They show that economic 
fundamentals are thought to be reflected in movements in the exchange rate in the medium 
and long run, a result consistent with empirical findings by Mark (1995) for several currencies 
and survey findings by Taylor and Allen (1992) for the London market and by Gehrig and 
Menkhoff (2004) for Germany. A slight difference in the response pattern between Bishkek 
and the other financial centers is that for the developed FX markets the number of affirmative 
responses increases with the time horizon, whereas for Bishkek the maximum responses are at 
the medium-term horizon. Greater political or economic uncertainty resulting in slightly 
greater myopic behavior may be one explanation for the Bishkek results, although we are 
unable to offer an empirical test for this claim. 
  The independence tests confirm the congruous perceptions of Bishkek traders with the 
two groups of financial centers (marked in bold are the responses to the questions listed in 
Table 5). The tests support the percentages of affirmative responses, revealing that exchange 
rate movements do not reflect changes in fundamentals at the intradaily horizon but do so at 
longer horizons. The p-values from the independence tests are all greater than 0.05 except for 
the long-run horizon with the North Atlantic group.  
  The affirmative responses to whether PPP is a good predictor of exchange rate 
movements is given only for Bishkek, New York, and London in Table 5b.
12 Again, the 
responses of all traders show that PPP is thought not to have much predictive power at the 
intradaily frequency but some at longer horizons. A statistical test of this claim is only 
supported for the long run. The p-values of the independence test is lower than 0.05 for the 
intraday and medium run horizon. 
The next question on economic fundamentals asks whether excessive speculation, 
bank manipulation, or excessive central bank intervention account for exchange rate 
movements not explained by economic fundamentals. The affirmative responses, listed in 
                                                 
12 Cheung and Wong (2000) did not pose this question in their study for Asian financial centers.   12
Tables 5c, show considerable differences between Bishkek traders and traders from developed 
FX markets. Traders from developed FX markets place a high weight to excessive speculation 
and a weight of less than 50% to bank manipulation, whereas the Bishkek traders assign a low 
weight to speculation and a high weight to bank manipulation and excessive central bank 
intervention.    
The independence tests show that the perceptions of the Bishkek traders clearly differ 
from those held by the two groups. The p-values of the independence tests are below 0.05 in 
each case, despite the fact that New York and London exhibit strong evidence of homogenous 
beliefs. The latter result is not true for the Asian group, since all p-values in parentheses are 
well below 0.05. 
     Table 5d provides the average rank of exchange rate predictability on a scale from 1 
(no predictability) to 5 (high predictability). The relative differences across time horizons for 
the individual markets allow us to state how confident traders are at making exchange rate 
predictions. Considerable discrepancy arises between Bishkek traders and the others. The 
Bishkek traders express high confidence in being able to predict exchange rate movements at 
the intradaily frequency, but this confidence wanes fast as the forecast horizon moves forward 
in time. The other traders (except for Tokyo) express greater confidence at being able to 
predict exchange rate movements at the medium-term horizon.  
  The Bishkek traders’ responses on the ability to predict intradaily versus longer term 
horizons is difficult to reconcile with their answers given to questions 5a and 5b on 
fundamentals. They appear to go in opposite directions: yes to the importance of 
fundamentals at the medium to long run horizon, but no to the ability to predict at the same 
horizon. This conflict suggests that changes in exchange rates are due to unpredictable 
changes in fundamentals. The predictable changes are already impounded into the spot rate. 
 
   13
 Speculation   
Speculation can be viewed as having a stabilizing or a destabilizing influence on 
financial markets. Generally the latter is associated with illiquid markets. Affirmative 
responses to whether speculation increases volatility, moves exchange rates away from 
fundamentals, increases liquidity and improves market efficiency are given in Table 6a. 
Regarding speculation and volatility, virtually all FX dealers believe that speculation 
increases exchange rate volatility. This result is supported by the independence test. In terms 
of fundamentals, more than three-fourths of the Kyrgyz traders believe speculation moves the 
exchange rate away from fundamentals. The absence of forward markets and private sector 
agents (i.e., hedge funds) willing to hold open positions for a prolonged period in Bishkek 
suggests that there are few stabilizing speculators that push the exchange rate toward the 
fundamental price. The London and New York markets instead see speculation as beneficial 
in that it pushes the exchange rate towards fundamentals, whereas the Asian traders with 
affirmative responses of nearly 50% have no clear views. These differences in perceptions 
between Bishkek and the North Atlantic group and also with the Asian group are supported by 
the independence tests.  
Although the Bishkek traders recognize the benefits of increased liquidity and 
improved market efficiency stemming from speculation, they are not as convinced as their 
colleagues from developed financial centers. Traders from developed financial centers 
responded consistently in the affirmative in more than 75% of the cases, whereas the Bishkek 
traders responded affirmatively at levels just below 60%. This disparity is reflected in the 
results of the independence tests for liquidity. The null hypothesis of homogenous views 
among FX traders is rejected for both groups. Instead the results are mixed when testing for 
speculation's influence on market efficiency; the null of homogeneous perceptions cannot be 
rejected for Bishkek versus New York/London, whereas it is rejected for the difference   14
between Bishkek and Hong Kong/Tokyo/Singapore. We are unable to offer an explanation for 
this result. 
 
  Central bank interventions 
The NBRK intervenes regularly in the Kyrgyz som / US dollar spot market.
13 The 
NBKR's intervention rule of leaning against short-term fluctuations has been successful in 
keeping the som stable against the dollar in recent years. The NBKR intervenes in both 
directions to smooth seasonal fluctuations and to stem the volatility in the Kyrgyz som / US 
dollar rate. However, in recent years it has purchased more dollars than it has sold dollars.
14 
Although there are no empirical studies on the effectiveness of NBRK interventions, many 
studies for transition and emerging economies summarized in BIS (2005) find that foreign 
exchange interventions are effective.
15 The survey responses on NBRK interventions confirm 
this view.  
Kyrgyz traders perceive central bank interventions to be much more successful than 
FX dealers from developed FX markets.
16 This observation is true for all responses listed in 
Table 6b: interventions are seen as not necessarily increasing exchange rate volatility or 
moving the exchange rate away from fundamentals; and interventions are perceived to be 
conducted at the right moment and achieve their desired goal. Particularly large differences in 
views arise on the impact of interventions on the volatility exchange rates: an issue frequently 
examined in the empirical literature that remains unresolved. The responses from FX traders 
in developed financial markets suggest that interventions have a destabilizing influence on the 
                                                 
13 Not all interventions are sterilized. For a discussion of NBRK monetary policy objectives see 
http://www.int.nbkr.kg/web/interfeis.builder_frame?language=ENG. 
14 NBRK exchange rate reserves in dollars increased from $24.5 million in 2002 to $71.3 million in 2005. 
Seasonal fluctuations in the som / dollar exchange rate occur because of tax payments and agricultural exports. 
15 For developed financial markets, the opposite views generally holds, see Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Neely 
(2005). 
16 Survey studies on foreign exchange interventions by Neely (2006, 2000), Lecourt and Raymond (2004), and 
Mihaljek (2004) cover similar issues, but investigate aggregated perceptions of central bankers. They do not 
examine the differing views between high and low income countries and heterogeneous perceptions among 
central bankers from the same institution.    15
exchange rate in that they increase exchange rate volatility. Many empirical studies for the 
major currencies by Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Beine and Laurent (2003), Dominguez 
(1998), Edison, Casin, and Liang (2003) and others find that central bank interventions are 
associated with higher exchange rate volatility. Instead, Kyrgyz traders regard interventions to 
be beneficial in stabilizing the exchange rate: a result that is consistent with empirical 
evidence from emerging markets, see Disyatat and Galati (2005).  These views based on the 
high affirmative responses by Kyrgyz traders are supported by the independence tests in Table 
6b. In each case, the null hypothesis of homogenous perceptions is rejected at the 5% critical 
level for both groups.  
One explanation for the opposing views on the effectiveness of central bank 
interventions is what psychologists call social desirability bias. The Kyrgyz respondents are 
aware that the NBKR collected the survey data. This is in contrast to the survey information 
for the developed financial centers, which were collected by academic researchers. If Kyrgyz 
FX traders are not independent and are providing answers that the NBKR wants to hear, then 
clearly the effectiveness of NBKR policy is overstated.   
An alternative explanation for the difference in perceptions could be microstructure 
issues. Let us consider the role of market liquidity and asymmetric information. In a small and 
illiquid FX market such as in Bishkek, the NBKR exercises considerable market power. It is 
argued by Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Neely (2005) that central bank interventions in liquid 
FX markets are too small to directly influence the exchange rate through the portfolio balance 
channel (i.e., the relative supply of domestic and foreign currency denominated assets affects 
the foreign-exchange risk premium and thereby the exchange rate). Central banks have to 
resort to other mechanisms such as the signalling channel that tries to influence the exchange 
rate through changes in exchange rate expectations, see Neely (2006 and 2005). In this 
context, the NBKR conducts its interventions through the interbank platform, which is visible 
to all market participants. Its presence is not secret because it sets and responds to quotes   16
when conducting an intervention. Neely's (2000) survey on central bank intervention 
practices, instead, finds that most central banks from developed and leading emerging market 
countries try to avoid the interbank trading platform (i.e., EBS or Reuters Dealings) when 
executing foreign exchange interventions with commercial banks. They prefer telephone 
communication. This means official or rumoured interventions are communicated through a 
newswire service and not through observed actions as is the case for the NBKR.
17 Further, the 
NBKR possesses order flow information of all interbank transactions. This advantage allows 
the NBKR to deduce the direction and volume of the intervention in real time needed to 
correct market imbalances. This is not the case for the five central banks of the other financial 
centers. Critics of central bank intervention, such as Schwartz (2000), argue that central banks 
do not posses an information advantage and should refrain from intervening. An additional 
factor for the perceived success of NBKR interventions is the recent tightening of the limits 
on open positions for foreign currency (i.e., the mismatch of assets and liabilities in foreign 
currency) for Kyrgyz commercial banks.
18 The tightening of the limits on open positions 
reduces the ability of commercial banks to maintain long/short positions for speculative 
purposes. Apart from the NBKR, there are few agents in the Kyrgyz market that are able to 
operate with prolonged open positions.   
 
4. Conclusions 
  The principal hypothesis asks whether FX dealers from a low income country with a 
low level of financial development have similar views on fundamentals to FX dealers from 
developed financial centers. The perceptions of Kyrgyz FX dealers are tested against the 
beliefs of traders from five financial centers.  If microstructure issues do not matter and 
macroeconomic developments are perceived to be stable, then FX dealers across international 
                                                 
17 See Fischer (2005) for a discussion of newswire announcements of foreign exchange interventions and their 
transmission in the FX market. 
18 Currently, open positions in foreign currency cannot exceed 15% of total bank capital.    17
markets should regard similarly the importance of fundamentals for exchange rate 
movements. 
The international evidence on FX dealers from the interbank market finds that the 
trading practices between Bishkek FX dealers and their counterparts from developed FX 
markets is not uniform. Survey responses especially from FX dealers in New York and 
London reveal that they have homogenous views on the role of economic fundamentals, the 
effectiveness of central bank interventions, and the influence of exchange rate speculation. 
The Bishkek traders instead express less confidence in exchange rate forecasting and in the 
long-run impact of economic fundamentals being accurately reflected in exchange rate 
movements. These near-sighted beliefs can be explained by a lack of market depth and/or 
greater uncertainty attributed to the domestic currency. The destabilizing impact arising from 
exchange rate speculation and the effectiveness of NBKR interventions from the Kyrgyz 
responses are contrary to views held by FX traders operating in developed FX markets. We 
attribute the low liquidity level and the strong presence of the central bank as important 
explanations for the differences in the survey responses between FX dealers from Kyrgyzstan 
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Table 1:  
 
    Background information about Kyrgyz survey respondents and their institution 
 
         
1a.  Your current position is? 
 
   treasurer/manager     58.82%      
   chief/senior  dealer     14.71%      
   dealer/junior  dealer     26.47%      
   other      0.00%      
 
1b.   How many years experience in currency trading do you have? 
 
   1  to  3  years     35.29%      
   3  to  5  years     20.59%        
   5  to  7  years     23.53%      
   more  than  7  years     17.65%      
                              
  
1c.  What is you daytime position limit? 
 
    50 000 - 100 000 USD      41.18%        
    100 000 - 300 000 USD      20.59%      
    300 000 - 500 000 USD      20.59%      
    500 000 - 1 000 000 USD      5.88%      
    1 000 000 USD and more      8.82%      
 
1d.  What is the staff size of your currency trading unit? 
 
  How many FX dealers are in your bank?       
 
   1  dealer      13.33%      
   2  or  3  dealers     88.24%      
   more  than  3  dealers     0.00%      
 
1e.  Is there foreign capital invested in your bank? 
 
 Yes      47.06% 
 No      52.94% 
 
  If yes from where  
   i.        Kazakhstan     17.65% 
   i i .       R u s s i a       5 . 8 8 %  
   iii.    Turkey    5.88% 
   iv.    Europe      5.88% 
   v.      Other      20.59% 
 
1f.  What is the size of bank’s average daily FX turnover (in million som)? 
 
 .5    -  1.0      8.82%      
 1.0  -    3.0      41.18%      
 3.0  -    6.0      17.65%      
 6.0  –  10.0      14.71%      
 more  than  10.0  million  som    2.94%      
 
1g.  What types of trades do you as a dealer perform most frequently? 
 
 Customer  trades     94.12% 
 Speculative  trades     5.88% 
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Table 2:  Information about the bid-ask spread for Kyrgyz Banks    
 
2a.  What is the typical bid-ask spread quoted to clients in customer trades? 
      average     median       std     
som  /  US  dollar          0.159   (0.128)   [0.102]     
  som  /  Russian  ruble          0.045     (0.020)     [0.063]     
  som  /euro         0.352     (0.250)     [0.260]     
  som  /  Kazak  tenge      0.049     (0.010)     [0.075]     
 
2b.  Under most circumstances, the bid-ask spread is determined by (indicate one) 
 
Market  convention      88.24%    
The potential cost of making that quote      11.76%     
Other       0.00%    
 
2c.  If most of the bid-ask spreads for customer trades conform to market convention, what is the most important reason for 
conformity? 
 
Your  bank’s  policy      20.59%       
Maintain an equitable relationship with  your  client   11.76%       
To secure a good market image for the bank      41.18%           
To  maximize  trading  profits     17.65%      
To  follow  the  practice  of  major  players    5.88%       
O t h e r        2 . 9 4 %       
    
2d.  Check the three most important reasons for quoting a bid-ask spread for customer trades that are different from market 
convention. 
 
   a thin and quiet market 
    most  important    3.92%       
    very  important    2.94%       
    important     5.88%       
 
  a thin and nervous market 
    most  important    2.94%       
    very  important    6.86%       
    important     1.96%       
 
  an unexpected change in market trading      
    most  important    9.80%       
    very  important    11.76%       
    important     3.92%       
 
  before and after market news 
    most  important    0.00%      
    very  important    4.90%         
    important     4.90%         
 
 increased  market  volatility 
    most  important    13.73%         
    very  important    5.88%         
    important     0.98%         
 
  holding a position against market trend      
    most  important      0.00%         
    very  important    5.88%         
    important     4.90%         
 
  a quote for a specific customer 
    most  important    4.90%         
    very  important    0.98%         
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Table 3:  Market Dominance of Kyrgyz Banks  
 
  Interbank  FX  market        
 
3a.   Do you agree that the following FX markets in Kyrgyzstan are dominated by one or a few “big” players?
   
a)  som / US dollar     
    Y e s      9 1 . 1 8 %       
 N o      8 . 8 2 %       
   N o   O p i n i o n     0 . 0 0 %       
  b)  som / Russian ruble      
   Y e s      8 . 8 2 %       
   N o      7 9 . 4 1 %       
   N o   O p i n i o n     1 1 . 7 6 %       
  c)  som / euro     
   Y e s      8 . 8 2 %       
   N o      7 9 . 4 1 %       
   N o   O p i n i o n     1 1 . 7 6 %       
  d)  som / Kazak tenge     
   Y e s      2 . 9 4 %       
   N o      8 5 . 2 9 %       
   N o   O p i n i o n     1 1 . 7 6 %       
 
 
3b.   Select three reasons (and rank their priority) for the most important sources of competitive advantage for 
the largest players in the FX market.    
 
  a) lower operating costs   
   most  important    0.92%      
   very  important    2.78%      
   important     5.55%      
  b) better informed about the market   
   most  important    0.92%      
   very  important    6.48%      
   important     7.41%      
  c) a large customer base   
   most  important    22.22%      
   very  important    6.48%      
   important     1.85%      
  d) ability to deal in large volumes   
   most  important    3.70%      
   very  important    8.33%      
   important     1.85%      
  e) ability to influence the exchange rate   
   most  important    3.70%      
   very  important    4.63%      
   important     2.78%      
  f) ability to offer new FX products    
   most  important    0.00%      
   very  important    0.00%      
   important     2.78%      
  g) accessibility to global trading networks    
   most  important    0.00%      
   very  important    0.92%      
   important     1.85%      
  h) experienced traders    
   most  important    3.70%      
   very  important    5.56%      
   important     5.56%      
  i) other (please specify)   
   most  important    0.00%      
   very  important    0.00%       
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Table 4:  Cash Market Information for Kyrgyz Banks  
 
   
 
   How fast do you believe the market can assimilate the new information when considering the following 
information?    
 
  Economic news 
   Less  than  10  min     8.82%       
   Less  than  30  min     26.47%       
   Greater  than  30     52.94%       
 
 Political  news 
   Less  than  10  min     20.59%       
   Less  than  30  min     32.35%       
   Greater  than  30     32.35%       
 
 Customer  information 
   Less  than  10  min     2.94%       
   Less  than  30  min     20.59%       
   Greater  than  30     55.89%       
 
Cash market information 
   Less  than  10  min     26.47%       
   Less  than  30  min     41.18%       
   Greater  than  30     20.59%       
 
News from the NBKR   
   Less  than  10  min     38.23%         
   Less  than  30  min     20.59%       
   Greater  than  30     29.41%       
 
Other  
   Less  than  10  min     0.00%         
   Less  than  30  min     0.00%         
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Table 5:  International Comparison for Economic Fundamentals 
 
5a. Do exchange rate movements accurately reflect changes in fundamental value? 
 (percentage of affirmative responses) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London   Hong  Kong  Tokyo   Singapore 
 
Intraday   0%   1%   3%   4%   5%   6% 
Medium  run  68%   59%   58%   54%   50%   51% 
Long  run   65%   88%   87%   80%   79%   82% 
 
 
Independence  tests    Bishkek/New  York/London   Bishkek/Hong  Kong/Tokyo/Singapore 
 
Intraday      0.484  (0.723)     0.369  (0.891) 
Medium  run     0.159  (0.571)     0.082  (0.512) 
Long  run      0.043  (0.590)     0.081  (0.698) 
 
5b. Do you think the PPP condition can be used to predict exchange rate movements?    
(percentage of affirmative responses) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London      
 
Intraday   9%   1%   5% 
Medium  run  47%   9%   16% 
Long  run   47%   40%   44% 
 
Independence  tests    Bishkek/New  York/London      
 
Intraday      0.011  (0.853)        
Medium  run        0.000  (0.111)       
Long  run      0.170  (0.400) 
       
 
5c. If the FX market does not accurately reflect the exchange rate fundamental value, which of the following factors 
do you believe are responsible for this? (percentage of affirmative responses) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London   Hong  Kong  Tokyo   Singapore 
 
Excessive     29%   74%   87%   86%   75%   89% 
Speculation 
 
Manipulation  by  65%   44%   41%   42%   25%   41% 
Banks 
 
Excessive  central    65%   39%   49%   63%   49%   48% 
Bank interventions 
 
Independence  tests    Bishkek/New  York/London   Bishkek/Hong  Kong/Tokyo/Singapore 
 
Excessive  Speculation   0.000  (0.511)     0.000  (0.014) 
Manipulation  by  Banks      0.011  (0.497)     0.000  (0.004) 
Excess  central  interventions    0.005  (0.674)     0.000  (0.005) 
 
 
5d. On a scale 1 to 5, please indicate if you believe the market trend is predictable 
Average Exchange rate predictability: scale 1 (no predictability) to 5 (high predictability) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London   Hong  Kong  Tokyo   Singapore 
 
Intraday   3.97   2.31   2.20   2.97   3.08   2.97 
Medium  run  2.35   3.10   2.91   3.04   3.00   2.99 
Long  run   1.71   2.96   2.89   2.58   2.39   2.56 
 
 
 Note: Medium run denotes up to six months and long run greater than six months. In parenthesis is the p-value of the independence tests 
without Bishkek. The number of observations Bishkek 34, New York 142, Hong Kong 227, Tokyo 76, Singapore 87. 
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Table 6:  International Comparison for Speculation and Interventions 
 
 
6a. Speculation  (percentage of responses given in bold) 
 
In your opinion, speculation (circle the appropriate choice) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London   Hong  Kong  Tokyo   Singapore 
 
increases/decreases      91%        84%      93%       96%       91%       98% 
exchange rate  
volatility 
 
moves ex. rate     76%        29%      33%       53%       41%       46% 
away from / towards 
fundamentals 
 
increases /decrease     59%        81%    80%      89%       89%       82% 
market liquidity 
 




Independence  tests    Bishkek/New  York/London   Bishkek/Hong  Kong/Tokyo/Singapore 
 
increases  volatility    0.056  (0.076)     0.109  (0.099) 
fundamental    value      0.000  (0.768)     0.000  (0.222) 
increases  liquidity    0.005  (0.982)     0.000  (0.333) 




6b. Central bank intervention    (percentage of responses given in bold) 
 
In your opinion, central bank intervention (circle the appropriate choice) 
 
  Bishkek   New  York   London   Hong  Kong  Tokyo   Singapore 
 
increases/decreases      21%       61%       60%       72%       61%       62% 
exchange rate volatility  
 
move ex. rate     18%       45%       49%       29%       45%       37% 













Independence  tests    Bishkek/New  York/London   Bishkek/Hong  Kong/Tokyo/Singapore 
 
increases  volatility    0.000  (0.988)     0.000  (0.074) 
fundamental  value      0.006  (0.874)     0.006  (0.041) 
appropriate  time    0.002  (0.192)     0.005  (0.518) 




 Note: In parenthesis is the p-value of the independence tests without Bishkek. The number of observations Bishkek 34, New York 142, 
Hong Kong 227, Tokyo 76, Singapore 87. 
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